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Abstract 
This article aims to contribute to the long-standing discussion about nonprofit 
organizations’ (NPOs) dependence on public funding and its consequences on their 
advocacy role in modern societies. Drawing on resource dependence theory and data from 
a quantitative survey, the study investigates the impact of public funding and its extent on 
nonprofit engagement in advocacy. Traditionally, scholars have cautioned that NPOs 
reliant on public sources will hesitate to pursue political objectives and to engage in 
advocacy work. Yet, empirical findings are strikingly inconsistent. One of the reasons for 
these ambiguous findings may be the way advocacy is measured. To address this issue, 
we apply two different approaches to evaluate NPO engagement. Both sets of findings 
from our multivariate analyses of Austrian NPOs suggest that public funding does not 
have a negative impact on advocacy. 
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Nonprofits’ autonomy from the state is a core feature of these organizations. It is crucial 
for them to accomplish their mission independently and to follow their “civic virtues” 
(Chaves, Stephens, & Galaskiewicz, 2004, p. 292; Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004, p. 9). 
Especially in carrying out the essential function of engaging in advocacy and being a 
voice for citizens, nonprofits’ independence from the government has been considered 
pivotal (Frumkin, 2002; James & Rose-Ackerman, 1986; Kendall, 2003; Kramer, 1981; 
Salamon, Hems, & Chinnock, 2000). This is also true for financial independence 
(Salamon, 1995; Smith, 2004). 
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Nonetheless, today many nonprofits obtain large proportions of their revenues from 
public agencies. On average, some 31% of the total income of nonprofits in the United 
States and about 45% of those of European organizations stems from the state (Salamon 
& Sokolowski, 2004). This discrepancy between claim and reality has been the cause of 
lengthy discussion (Chikoto, 2010; Fetter, 1901; Fleischer, 1914; cited in Smith, 1998). 
Scholars and practitioners fear that nonprofit organizations (NPOs) will feel pressure on 
their political activities if they accept public funds—and, as a consequence, will reduce or 
even abandon advocacy. 
Despite these long-standing debates, empirical support has been rare. There are many 
articles that focus on the (negative) influence of public funding on nonprofit engagement 
in advocacy, but only about 20 of these examine this relationship empirically—and 
almost all use data from the United States. The findings, moreover, are inconclusive, 
providing no unanimous evidence that public funding impedes advocacy. These 
inconsistent findings may be attributed to different measures of advocacy (Onyx, Dalton, 
Melville, Casey, & Banks 2008). 
This study investigates the relationship between public funding and nonprofit 
engagement in advocacy to stimulate further debate on this topic and to generate an 
empirical analysis from Central Europe. Drawing on previous literature and on resource 
dependence theory and organizational capacity building, we develop four hypotheses, 
which are tested using data from a 2007 survey of 250 Austrian NPOs. To establish a 
connection with earlier studies on the issue and to address the problem of contradictory 
results from previous research, we apply two different approaches to measuring nonprofit 
engagement in advocacy. The first metric is based on the resources devoted to advocacy 
by the NPO. The second depends on the advocacy practices in which it engages. We test 
each hypothesis using both measures. By doing so, we aim to disentangle contradictory 
results and to encourage discussion on this topic because these are the first empirical 
results for Central Europe. 
Literature Review: Consequences of Public Funding on Nonprofit 
Engagement in Advocacy 
Advocacy is commonly referred to as a nonprofit’s crucial civic function. According to 
Jenkins (2006), the overall aim of advocacy is to “correct imbalanced political 
representation by ensuring that a broader set of interests are voiced” (p. 308). Multiple 
activities intend to achieve this goal. They include talks with governments, the 
monitoring of government programs, legal advocacy in the courts, calls for boycotts and 
demonstrations, and the drawing up of petition letters, among others (Boris & Mosher-
Williams, 1998; Jenkins, 2006; McCarthy & Castelli, 2001; Onyx et al., 2008). All are 
intended to do one of three things: To influence government decisions; to shape the 
policies of private institutions and corporations; or to encourage community and political 
participation (Jenkins, 2006). 
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With regard to the impact of public funding on nonprofit engagement in advocacy, two 
main lines of argument are discussed in the literature. The first, generally widespread 
view draws on resource dependence theory (e.g., Chaves et al., 2004; Moulton & Eckerd, 
2012; Schmid, Bar, & Nirel, 2008). It implies that NPOs that receive public funding will 
eventually reduce their advocacy activities or even refrain from them altogether for fear 
of losing their funding. The second posits precisely the reverse effect, that is, the 
nonprofits who receive public funding will increase their engagement in advocacy (e.g., 
Chaves et al., 2004; Leroux & Goerdel, 2009; Mosley, 2011). On one hand, this 
proposition is based on the idea that such NPOs will have more resources with which to 
advocate (e.g., Bass, Arons, Guinane, Carter, & Rees, 2007; Mosley, 2011). On the other 
hand, it assumes that they will use their access to the government, which they have gained 
through obtaining funding, for advocacy purposes (e.g., Bass et al., 2007; Kelleher & 
Yackee, 2009). 
The empirical studies that have investigated these two opposing assumptions 
concerning the consequences of public funding on nonprofit advocacy activities show a 
slightly different picture (see Table 1); their results are mixed. Although most of these 
analyses suggest that public funding will increase NPO engagement in advocacy, several 
studies come to the opposite conclusion. Furthermore, some do not find any association at 
all, whereas others reveal inconclusive findings. Possible explanations for these divergent 
results can be found in the data used (cross-section vs. panel data), the types of nonprofits 
analyzed, country-specific aspects, the models used to analyze the data (i.e., some studies 
are concerned with the probability of advocacy, and others with its extent or the range of 
advocacy activities); and, finally, the method used to measure advocacy. 
Key Findings From Studies on Advocacy 
The majority of studies we analyzed find government funding to be positively associated 
with advocacy. Most of these were based on regression analyses and cross-sectional data 
for nonprofits in the United States (see Table 1). To start with, O’Regan and Oster (2002) 
investigated whether or not NPOs engaged in advocacy by examining whether board 
members had undertaken any government-related advocacy measures. Similarly, Hwang 
and Suárez (2008) examined whether an organization “advocate[d] on behalf of its clients 
or cause through public information campaigns, legislative campaigns, or other activities” 
(p. 13) 
Although using a similar method, Salamon (2002), Leroux and Goerdel (2009), 
Mosley (2011), and Moulton and Eckerd (2012) were not concerned with whether or not 
an NPO engaged in advocacy, but to what extent it did so. The approach used to measure 
advocacy activity in each case was, however, quite different. Salamon’s study, for 
example, analyzed advocacy activities as a percentage of expenditure, whereas Leroux 
and Goerdel measured the frequency of political-representation and political-mobilization 
activities. Taking yet another approach, Mosley asked whether nonprofits use indirect and 
insider advocacy tactics. Finally, Moulton and Eckerd used an index of three different 
advocacy activities. 
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Table 1:  Empirical Evidence on the Impact of Public Funding on Advocacy 
Authors/year Country Data Measures of advocacy Findings 
Quantitative studies 
Salamon 
(2002) 
United States Cross-sectional data 
of 3,400 nonprofits 
Resources: Share of 
expenditures devoted to 
advocacy (in %) 
Positive impact of public 
funding on advocacy 
O’Regan and  
Oster (2002) 
United States 
New York City 
Cross-sectional data 
of 403 nonprofits  
Activities: Undertaking 
advocacy with the 
government (yes/no) 
Positive impact of public 
funding on advocacy 
activities of nonprofits’ 
boards 
Chaves, 
Stephens, and 
Galaskiewicz 
(2004) 
United States Cross-sectional data 
of 1,236 nonprofits 
(field: Religion) 
Activities: Undertaking 
eight different forms of 
advocacy (for each: 
Yes/no) 
No or mildly positive 
impact of public funding 
on advocacy 
Chaves et al. 
(2004) 
United States 
Minneapolis/St. 
Paul 
Panel (1984-1994) 
data of 229 nonprofits 
Activities: Engaging in 
lobbying efforts, 
undertaking activities to 
influence politicians, the 
government, or 
administration (for each: 
Yes/no) 
No or mildly positive 
impact of public funding 
on advocacy 
Leech  
(2006) 
United States 
Washington, 
D.C. 
Cross-sectional data 
of 700 nonprofits 
(field: Interest 
groups)  
Activities: Lobby-index 
by 30 different tactics to 
lobby (each measured by 
a 5-point Likert-type 
scale) 
No impact of public 
funding on the amount 
and intensity of advocacy 
Nicholson-
Crotty (2007) 
United States Cross-sectional data 
of 487 nonprofits 
Activities: Undertaking 
advocacy from Internal 
Revenue Code Form 
(yes/no) 
No or positive impact of 
public funding (grants or 
contracts) on advocacy 
Bass, Arons, 
Guinane, 
Carter, and 
Rees (2007) 
United States Cross-sectional data 
of 1,738 nonprofits 
Activities: Engaging in 
nine different forms of 
advocacy activities (each 
measured by a 5-point 
Likert-type scale) 
Positive correlation 
between (receipt and 
level of) public funding 
and nonprofits’ advocacy 
activities 
Hwang and 
Suárez 
(2008) 
United States 
San Francisco 
Bay Area 
Cross-sectional data 
of 200 nonprofits 
Activities: Advocating on 
behalf of clientele 
through different 
activities (yes/no) 
Positive impact of public 
fundinga on nonprofits’ 
advocacy activities 
Faulk (2008) United States Panel (2003-2005) of 
520 nonprofits 
(engaging in 
advocacy) 
Activities: Mentioning of 
nonprofits in news and 
newspapers (amount) 
Positive impact of public 
funding on nonprofits’ 
advocacy activities 
Schmid, Bar, 
and Nirel 
(2008) 
Israel Cross-sectional data 
of 96 nonprofits 
(field: Social 
services) 
Activities: Importance of 
six political activities and 
seven modes of operation 
(each measured by a 5-
point Likert-type scale) 
Negative impact of 
public funding from local 
authorities on nonprofits’ 
political activities 
Suárez (2009) United States 
San Francisco 
Bay Area 
Cross-sectional data 
of 200 nonprofits 
Activities: Political 
engagement of nonprofits 
via homepage 
No impact of public 
funding on nonprofits’ 
political and civic 
engagement 
 
Nicholson-
Crotty (2009) 
United States Cross-sectional data 
of 487 nonprofits 
Activities: Undertaking 
advocacy from IRC form 
No clear impact of public 
funding (grants or 
contracts) on advocacy, 
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(yes/no) but negative impact on 
aggressive advocacy 
Leroux and 
Goerdel 
(2009) 
United States 
Michigan 
Cross-sectional data 
of 119 nonprofits 
Activities: Index on 
political representation 
(two items) and on 
political mobilization 
(three items)—each 
measured by a 5-point 
Likert-type scale 
Positive impact of (share 
of) public funding on 
political representation 
and on political 
mobilization 
Guo and 
Saxton  
(2010) 
United States 
Arizona 
Cross-sectional data 
of 174 nonprofits 
Activities: Index of 11 
advocacy strategies (for 
each: Yes/no) Resources: 
Level of resources (time, 
money, etc.) spent on 
advocacy activities (in %) 
Negative impact of 
public fundinga on 
advocacy activities 
(scope of advocacy), but 
no impact on the level of 
resources devote to 
advocacy (intensity of 
advocacy) 
Mosley 
(2011) 
United States Cross-sectional data 
of 321 nonprofits 
(field: Human 
services) 
Activities: Undertaking 
eight different forms of 
advocacy (for each: 
Yes/no), among them: 
Three insider tactics, five 
indirect tactics 
Positive impact of (share 
of) public funding on 
insider advocacy tactics 
and all advocacy tactics 
Moulton and 
Eckerd (2012) 
United States 
Ohio/Columbus 
Cross-sectional data 
of 105 nonprofits 
Activities: Index of three 
advocacy activities (each 
measured by a 5-point 
Likert-type scale) 
Positive impact of (share 
of) public funding on 
nonprofits advocacy role 
Garrow and 
Hasenfeld 
(2012) 
United States 
Los Angeles 
County 
Cross-sectional data 
of 159 nonprofits 
(field: Human 
services) 
Resources: Devoting 
resources to two different 
types of advocacy: 
Advocacy for social 
benefits and for 
organizational benefits 
(yes/no) 
No impact of public 
funding on advocacy for 
social benefits compared 
with advocacy for 
organizational benefits 
Qualitative studies 
Sandfort 
(2005) 
United States 
Minnesota 
Case study (field: 
Domestic violence) 
— Negative consequences 
of earmarked public 
funding: More individual 
services, but less political 
mobilization of citizens 
Onyx, Dalton, 
Melville, 
Casey, 
and Banks 
(2008) 
Australia 
NSW and 
Queensland 
Interviews and 
document analysis of 
24 nonprofits (fields: 
Social, environment) 
— Partially positive, 
partially negative impact 
of public funding on 
advocacy activities 
Mosley 
(2012) 
United States 
Chicago 
Analyses of 
interviews with 42 
nonprofits (field: 
Homeless) 
— Positive impact of public 
funding on advocacy, 
advocacy focuses on 
sustaining funding and 
not on client 
representation 
a Public funding served as a control variable in this study. 
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The next three studies, though still based in the United States, drew on different data 
sources but also came to the conclusion that public funding relates positively to advocacy 
activity. Bass et al. (2007) examined the correlation between nonprofits’ share of public 
funding and the frequency of their advocacy activities. Second, Faulk (2008) applied 
regression analyses to panel data, measuring the extent of advocacy by NPOs’ online-
media presence, that is, by the number of press releases during a given period of time. 
Last but not the least, Mosley (2012) demonstrated in her qualitative study that public 
funding motivates nonprofits to advocate the promotion of their organization rather than 
to effect substantive policy change. 
Conversely, some studies did show a negative correlation between government funding 
and NPO engagement in advocacy. Sandfort’s (2005) case study of a U.S. shelter for 
battered women indicated that an increase in public funding went hand in hand with an 
increase in individual services and at the expense of political mobilization and 
empowerment. Likewise, Schmid et al. (2008) suggested in their cross-sectional analysis 
of Israeli nonprofit engagement across six different activities that public funding from 
local authorities was negatively associated with advocacy. 
However, although all the studies mentioned above indicated either a positive or a 
negative correlation between revenues from public sources and advocacy, the next group 
of research found no relationship in either direction. All three studies drew on cross-
sectional data from the United States, but where Leech (2006) used an additive index of a 
broad number of activities, Suárez (2009) examined the number of announcements 
published on NPOs’ web pages to determine whether the proportion of public funding 
had an impact on the nonprofit’s political activities as well as on its promotion of civic 
engagement. Taking a somewhat different approach, Garrow and Hasenfeld (2012) 
assessed whether nonprofits devoted any resources to advocacy. 
The final group of studies presented mixed findings on the connection between public 
funding and advocacy. Chaves et al. (2004) analyzed cross-sectional as well as panel data 
from the United States. They measured whether or not nonprofits engaged in eight 
different kinds of advocacy activities and ran separate regressions on these activities. In 
most cases, no impact could be found; in some, a positive impact was apparent (Chaves et 
al., 2004). Likewise, Guo and Saxton’s (2010) regression analyses were not able to reveal 
any clear relationships. They found that public funding undermined nonprofits’ efforts 
when measured by the frequency of different activities (e.g., public education, media 
advocacy, grassroots lobbying). However, when measuring “the proportion of (an) 
organization’s resources (time, money, etc.) . . . spent” on advocacy, they found no 
relationship (Guo & Saxton, 2010, p. 13). Similarly, Onyx et al.’s (2008) case study on an 
NPO in Australia reported that government finance sometimes encouraged but sometimes 
suppressed political advocacy. The same ambiguity can be seen in the results of 
Nicholson-Crotty. In her first article (Nicholson-Crotty, 2007), she showed that public 
funding in the form of grants and contracts could produce either a positive impact or none 
at all. In her second study (Nicholson-Crotty, 2009), however, she found that public 
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funding had a positive impact on advocacy but a negative one on grassroots lobbying, 
which she referred to as “aggressive advocacy.” 
Implications of Literature Review 
Our literature review has shown that the majority of previous empirical studies indicated 
that public funding has a positive impact on nonprofit advocacy engagement. Few articles 
observed a negative impact, three found no relationship at all, and five came to 
inconclusive conclusions. 
This body of previous research raises several questions. First, because all existing 
empirical studies—with the exception of one from Australia and one from Israel—relate 
to nonprofits in the United States, it is not clear whether their findings are applicable to 
other countries, especially to countries belonging to other nonprofit regimes (Salamon & 
Anheier, 1998). Second, we wonder to what extent different ways of measuring advocacy 
contribute to differences in findings. Some studies examine whether NPOs engage in 
advocacy at all, whereas others consider the extent, scope, type, and intensity of 
advocacy. Furthermore, the metrics used may be based either directly on advocacy 
activities or on the resources devoted to these. 
Authors who used advocacy activities as a measure asked nonprofits to identify the 
activities they had carried out from a given range of activities (e.g., mobilizing citizens to 
sign a petition, joining boycotts or demonstrations, or disseminating information) during 
the period concerned. Some researchers asked for responses to be given as a dichotomous 
variable. In some cases, these dichotomous variables were then added together and 
computed to create an additive index for the overall extent of advocacy. Others used 
Likert-type scales to measure the extent of individual activities (Bass  
et al., 2007; Leech, 2006; Moulton & Eckerd, 2012; Schmid et al., 2008). Another group 
measured advocacy in a nonreactive way by examining nonprofits’ media presence 
(Faulk, 2008; Hwang & Suárez, 2008). 
The authors who concentrated on resources recorded either the financial or the 
personnel resources devoted to advocacy in each organization. Salamon (2002) looked at 
the proportion of expenditure used for advocacy activities, whereas Guo and Saxton 
(2010) studied the share of total NPO resources (time, money, etc.) devoted to them. 
An examination of the various studies does not indicate an obvious relationship 
between measurement methods and findings about the impact of public funding on 
advocacy in most cases. However, Guo and Saxon’s (2010) findings contain evidence to 
suggest measurement-induced differences. These authors measured advocacy both in 
terms of resources and activities and found that public funding had no effect on the 
resources devoted to advocacy but did reduce the scope of nonprofits’ advocacy 
activities. Nicholson-Crotty’s (2009) findings suggest a similar conclusion. She found 
that although public funding had no impact on advocacy in general, it had a negative one 
on certain forms of advocacy, in this case, “aggressive” advocacy. From that, we might 
assume that government funding does not reduce the resources that nonprofits devote to 
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advocacy—there is no evidence of that in the studies reviewed—but may negatively 
affect what these resources are used for. 
We therefore directly address the following questions. First, we ask how public 
funding affects advocacy activities, how it affects the resources devoted to them, and 
whether its impact on these two measures can differ. Moreover, our article makes an 
important contribution by complementing existing research on the United States with an 
examination of NPOs in Central Europe, specifically in Austria, where the government 
and the nonprofit sector are closely intertwined. 
Theory and Hypotheses 
Most of the theoretical arguments that assume that nonprofits’ dependence on public 
funding reduces their engagement in advocacy are based on resource dependence theory. 
By contrast, arguments that support the opposite assumption derive from the concept of 
organizational capacity building. 
According to resource dependence theory, organizations are not autonomous entities 
that achieve the desired ends at their own discretion, but bodies that rely on resources 
from their environment to secure their survival (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). To maintain 
access to these resources, they are prepared to adapt to the perceived needs and 
expectations of important resource providers, that is, the organizations they depend on 
financially (Oliver, 1991; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). As a result, nonprofits who receive 
public funding can expect or may have already experienced a cut in financial support in 
the event of any undesired, oppositional advocacy (Chaves et al., 2004; Evans, 
Richmond, & Shields, 2005). Furthermore, nonprofits may also refrain from advocacy for 
fear of other negative sanctions (e.g., being excluded from meetings, loss of access to the 
legislative process, and reduction in clients assigned; Chaves et al., 2004; Ryan, 1999). 
Moreover, some NPOs may believe that they are prohibited from engaging in advocacy-
related activities while receiving public funds (Leech, 2006). In fact, some must sign 
contracts that explicitly restrict such activities.1 
The degree of perceived dependence is determined by the extent of public support. The 
more important the resources provided are, the more dependent the organization becomes. 
However, dependence decreases as the number of alternative resource providers increases 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). 
Nonprofits rely on a variety of resources to achieve their goals. Financial resources, 
volunteers, members, information, recognition, public support, and access to policy-
making processes are only a few examples (Johansson, 2003; Saidel, 1991). Furthermore, 
they depend almost entirely on their external environment for all these resources. It is 
arguable, however, that the resource exchange with the public sector seems to be of 
particular relevance. Public institutions depend on NPOs’ competence and their capacities 
to provide social services (Chaves et al., 2004; Saidel, 1991). In return, the public sector 
is the main provider of financial resources for nonprofits, at least in Central Europe. 
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There, on average, public funding makes up about 57% of the sector’s income; in Austria, 
the figure is 50% (Salamon & Sokolowski, 2004). 
Accordingly, resource dependence theory describes a highly relevant mechanism by 
which government funding might suppress nonprofit engagement in advocacy. This is 
true for work with the disabled in Austria. In that field, smaller organizations that are 
much less dependent on public funding are considerably more active in fighting for 
inclusion and against barriers than the large organizations, which benefit more 
substantially from public funds. We therefore suggest the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Nonprofits that receive public funds engage in advocacy to a lesser 
extent than those that do not. 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The higher the proportion of revenues received from the public 
sector, the smaller the extent to which nonprofits engage in advocacy activities. 
The opposite effect, namely that public funding enhances nonprofit engagement in 
advocacy, is based on two very different arguments. First, public funding enables such 
organizations to build capacity, to professionalize and thus enhance their ability to engage 
in advocacy. As a consequence, the advocacy activities themselves as well as the 
resources dedicated to advocacy can be increased (Bass et al., 2007). 
Second, because nonprofits that receive public funding are in regular contact with 
public organizations, they are more deeply involved in political issues than those that do 
not. In the event that public authorities need the expertise or opinion of nonprofits on a 
certain bill, they will tend to contact those who they know from the granting of public 
funds. Salamon (2002) labeled this explanation the paradigm of partnership (p. 8). This is 
particularly the case in Austria and in other countries in Central Europe, where NPOs are 
frequently invited to review draft bills and are thus embedded in political decision-
making. In contrast to the research presented above, other empirical evidence shows that 
nonprofits engaging in advocacy receive a larger share of their revenue from the 
government than those who do not engage in advocacy (Bass et al., 2007). In Austria, 
some of the biggest multipurpose nonprofits who receive significant amounts of public 
money in specific fields, such as care for the elderly, are also the most active campaigners 
against public policies in other fields, for example, poverty reduction. Examples include 
the Caritas and the Red Cross, who have established themselves as major providers of 
social services and have utilized their growth to establish professional advocacy. 
Therefore, our alternative two hypotheses read as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): Nonprofits that receive public funds engage in advocacy to a 
greater extent than those that do not. 
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): The higher the proportion of revenues received from the public 
sector, the greater the extent to which nonprofits engage in advocacy. 
As we posited that the divergent ways of measuring advocacy were one reason for the 
inconsistent findings of previous research, we investigate the impact of public funding on 
advocacy by using activity-related and resource-related measures in our analyses. By 
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comparing the two sets of results, we aim to establish whether or not the method of 
measurement matters. 
Our resource-related measures are based on the number of working hours invested in 
advocacy. According to the capacity-building perspective, public funding will positively 
affect the amount of resources that could potentially be dedicated to advocacy. As a 
result, nonprofits could, for example, professionalize their advocacy management and 
establish specific posts or departments, thus enabling greater and more effective advocacy 
efforts. However, our activity-related measures mainly reflect the relative importance of 
advocacy activities within an NPO’s mission. According to resource dependence theory, 
these will become less important as public funding increases, because they are usually in 
opposition to government policy, and can thus be expected to decrease with a rise in 
public funding. 
Consequently, the effects of public funding on advocacy may be paradoxical: A positive 
impact on the resources devoted to advocacy could go hand in hand with a decrease in 
advocacy’s relative importance within the mission and strategy of a nonprofit. At the same 
time, it is important to note that the power relation between nonprofits and government is not 
necessarily an asymmetric one, because mutual resource dependence is also possible, as 
mentioned above (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003). Various factors, such as the presence of 
alternative service providers for the government or the availability of alternative revenues for 
the nonprofit, may also affect government-nonprofit interdependence and thereby mitigate the 
effects of government funding on nonprofits’ advocacy efforts. Therefore, resource 
dependence theory suggests the importance of additional variables and not just the level of 
government funding. 
Data, Measures, and Method 
For this study, we analyzed data from 250 Austrian nonprofits. This sample is 
representative of the composition of the Austrian nonprofit sector, which is characterized 
by a large percentage of organizations active in the fields of social services and health, 
education and recreation, as well as groups active in international affairs, interest groups, 
and environmental organizations (see Table 3). An additional feature of the Austrian 
nonprofit sector is that its members are closely entwined with the public sector. On 
average, 50% of their revenue originates from the public sector, and they serve as 
important partners in the provision of social services (Pennerstorfer, Schneider, & Badelt, 
2013). In addition, they participate in political-decision making, because many 
established NPOs are integrated into the process of preparing laws. They are consulted on 
draft bills, and their comments are taken into account before a law is enacted (Neumayr, 
Schneider, Meyer, & Haider, 2007). Although there is no legal requirement for nonprofits 
to be involved in this process, it is nonetheless customary for legislators to call on their 
expertise (Heindl, 2003; Öhlinger, 2005). 
In contrast to the legal context facing 501 (c) (3) nonprofits in the United States, there 
are no legal restrictions on nonprofit advocacy in Austria, where organizations are always 
allowed to engage in such activities regardless of their funding structure. Moreover, there 
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are no negative connotations associated with the practice of advocacy or lobbying, as is 
the case in the United States (Bass et al., 2007). Indeed, advocacy by nonprofits is an 
uncontested feature of the corporatist culture in Austria and in many other European 
countries. Germany and France, for example, show a very similar relation between NPOs 
and the public sector (Salamon & Anheier, 1998). However, even in these corporatist 
nonprofit regimes, NPOs engaging in undesired advocacy activities are still in danger of 
losing public service contracts and public support, which might lead to a reduction in 
advocacy activities. 
The data used were collected in 2007 and originated from two different sources. We 
randomly selected nonprofits from our first source, the Austrian business register, which 
includes all organizations with at least one paid employee. In order not to exclude 
nonprofits without paid employees, which, after all, form an important part of the sector, 
we also drew on a second source, the register of Austrian associations. From this, we 
randomly selected NPOs operating with volunteer staff only. We contacted 750 
nonprofits in total and finally received data from 200 nonprofits drawn from the business 
register and from 50 organizations drawn from the register of associations. Thanks to this 
stratified approach, our sample was fully representative of this heterogeneous sector. 
Most importantly, it included some very small nonprofits to counteract the bias toward 
large, long-established organizations apparent in most empirical studies to date. The 
response rate for both samples was 33%. Because low response rates can produce biased 
samples, we checked whether our samples differed from the population of NPOs in the 
respective registers (Groves, 2006). With regard to size, funding structure, and field of 
activity, no significant deviation could be established. 
Data were collected using a standardized questionnaire, which was divided into 
two parts, one administered via telephone, the other sent out by e-mail after 
completion of the phone survey. The first part of the questionnaire contained 
questions that respondents could answer spontaneously (e.g., questions on the 
organization’s aims, tasks, and goals). The second part of the questionnaire elicited 
financial aspects and other organizational characteristics. By using this split-survey 
technique, we also aimed to avoid common method bias (cf. Sharma, Yetton, & 
Crawford, 2009). Our respondents were the CEOs or other key representatives of the 
nonprofits in question. 
Dependent Variables 
Resources dedicated to advocacy: Our first dependent variable reports the relative 
importance of advocacy activities compared with the whole spectrum of activities in 
which nonprofits engage. To calculate this, we inquired about the proportion of total 
working hours—voluntary as well as paid—devoted to advocacy. We offered 
nonprofits a list of 10 activity categories2 and asked them to report the percentage of 
total working hours devoted to each, assuming a total labor input of 100%. Together, 
2 of these categories—“advocacy and representation of interests” and “public 
relations”—define the percentage of work dedicated to advocacy.3 Although the first 
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category captured the core of advocacy, the category “public relations” was included 
to gather information about public awareness campaigns, public education activities, 
and similar projects. As shown in Table 3, nonprofits in our sample devoted, on 
average, some 10.3% of their total working hours to advocacy. 
Advocacy activities: To measure nonprofit engagement in advocacy using the activity 
approach, we handed out a list of five mission statements related to advocacy, for 
example, “to influence political and statutory decisions” or “to sensitize the general 
public on certain issues” (see Table 2). Respondents were asked to indicate the 
perceived importance of these statements in their organizations’ mission on a 5-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important). On the basis of 
these ratings, an overall score was calculated. As displayed in Table 2, the additive 
index shows a satisfactory level of reliability, with Cronbach’s α internal consistency 
value being .807. 
Independent Variables 
The independent variable for our H1 and H2 is a dichotomous variable that indicates 
whether or not nonprofits received funds from public institutions. As shown in Table 3, 
about 81% of all NPOs in the sample received public funding. The independent variable 
for H1a and H2a reports the share of public funding as a percentage of total revenue. On 
average, about 47% of total revenues stemmed from public sources (see Table 3). 
Control Variables 
Because our sample was very heterogeneous, reflecting the broad variety of organizations 
in the sector, we controlled for nonprofits’ field of activity. The model, therefore, 
includes dummy variables for the fields of education, social services (including health 
care), and culture and recreation. The fourth field, henceforth referred to as the “other 
field,” comprises unions and chambers, as well as organizations focused on 
environmental issues, animal protection, or the representation of political or civil rights. 
As Table 3 displays, the organizations in our sample were distributed quite evenly across 
these four fields of activity. We also controlled for NPOs’ geographical range of 
operation (local, regional, national, or international), applying dummy variables for the 
four ranges. Furthermore, our analysis controlled for NPO size, expressed as the natural 
logarithm of total revenues. This control was useful for evaluating resource dependence, 
as larger organizations are more powerful, which might facilitate their flexibility and 
independence from a single source like public funding (Kendall & Knapp, 2000, p. 128). 
In accordance with resource dependence theory, we used three more variables to 
control for the mutual dependence between nonprofits and government. First, we asked 
whether NPOs had access to alternative funding sources, as the availability of such 
resources lessens their dependence on public funding (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003; Saidel, 
1991; Schmid et al., 2008). We measured this availability using a dichotomous variable 
based on whether it was very easy (1) or very difficult (0) for the organization to gain 
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alternative financial support in the event of financial strain. Second, we assessed 
nonprofits’ substitutability (Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003), either as a provider of services or 
as a provider of information. We estimated this by asking whether there were any other 
nonprofits, for-profits, or government organizations working on similar topics and 
activities, and operating in the same local area, which competed with the respondent’s 
own organization in some way. Finally, we controlled for the diversity of the NPOs’ 
revenue sources, because organizations with more diverse streams of revenue tend to 
engage more in advocacy (Bass et al., 2007; Froelich, 1999). To do this, we used a 
Hirschman Herfindahl Index. This index ranges from “0” to “1,” with “0” representing 
perfect diversity and “1” representing perfect concentration. For instance, if an 
organization’s revenue came equally from public, private philanthropic, 
private/commercial, and ecclesiastical sources, the index value was “0”; if it came from 
one source only, the value was “1.” 
To test our hypotheses, we applied ordinary least square regression models, all 
including the same controls. Each hypothesis was tested by applying the two different 
approaches to measuring advocacy, namely the share of working hours devoted to it and 
the index reflecting the relative importance of advocacy activities. To facilitate an 
analysis of the contribution of the independent variable in explaining the variance (R2) of 
the dependent variable, we developed our models in three steps. The first included the 
government funding variables only. In the second, we added controls for size, industry, 
and geographic area. In the third model, we added the controls derived from resource 
dependence theory, namely, access to alternative sources of revenue, competition with 
other organizations, and diversity of revenue. By doing so, we aimed to discern the extent 
to which mutual dependence also matters. 
Table 2: Components of the Index to Measure Nonprofits Engagement in Advocacy 
Please indicate the importance of the following statements in the mission  
of your organization from 1 (not important) to 5 (very important) 
Cronbach’s α if item 
left out 
1. To influence political and statutory decisions on behalf of our stakeholders 
2. To write political/ideological statements 
3. To be a public voice for a certain group or issue 
4. To sensitize the general public on a certain issue 
5. To seek to amend political changes 
.765 
.755 
.784 
.785 
.759 
Cronbach’s α (five items) .807 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Information on Variables 
Variables n M SD Median Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables 
 Advocacy (hours dedicated) 242 10.3 9.6 7.0 0.0 45.0 
 Advocacy (importance) 249 2.3 1.0 2.2 0.0 4.0 
Independent variables 
 Receipt of public revenues (yes/no) 250 0.81 0.38 1.0 0.0 1.0 
 Share of public revenues (%) 250 46.89 34.50 49.8 0.0 100.0 
14 
 
Control variables 
 Size (ln of total income) 250 12.19 3.02 12.6 0.0 17.5 
 Field: Social (reference) 250 0.29 0.46 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Field: Recreation 250 0.18 0.39 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Field: Education 250 0.39 0.49 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Field: Other 250 0.13 0.33 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Geographical range: Local (ref) 250 0.30 0.46 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Geographical range: Regional 250 0.44 0.50 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Geographical range: National 250 0.14 0.35 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Geographical range: International 250 0.12 0.33 0.0 0.0 1.0 
 Existing competitor 250 0.56 0.50 1.0 0.0 1.0 
 Alternative sources of revenue 250 0.23 0.22 0.2 0.0 1.0 
 Diversity of revenues 250 0.60 0.28 0.7 0.0 0.9 
Results 
To start with the impact of receiving governmental funding, we can safely assert that this 
shows no relation to the advocacy activities of our sample. The first three columns in 
Table 4 display the findings when advocacy was measured by working hours. As Model 1 
shows, the receipt of public funding does not explain the variance of advocacy at all. In 
Model 2, about 15% of the variance is explained by the sum of all controls. When three 
additional controls for mutual dependence between nonprofits and government are added 
(Model 3), the R2 increases from .154 to .164. It is thus clear that the mere receipt of 
public funding had no impact on advocacy in any of the three models. 
The last three columns in Table 4 present the findings when advocacy is measured with 
an index, which captures the importance of advocacy activities. Once again, none of the 
three models reveal a significant relationship between public funding and advocacy. 
Receiving public funding contributes very little toward explaining the variance in 
advocacy. In contrast, the field in which the nonprofit is active and the geographical 
range of its operations have the strongest impact (see Model 5). Adding controls for 
mutual dependence does not substantially alter any of the coefficients (Model 6). 
In addition to the models presented in Table 4, we calculated interaction terms between 
public funding and individual fields, but the results remained unchanged. Clearly, neither 
H1 nor H2 can be confirmed by our analysis. 
Similarly, regression analyses essentially reveal no significant relationship between 
the proportion of public funding in total NPO revenues and advocacy. As displayed in 
the first three columns of Table 5, the share of public funding does not contribute to 
explaining the variance of advocacy measured by working hours in any of the three 
models. Instead, about 12% of the variance is explained by the control variables. 
The last three columns in Table 5 present the findings for our activity-based 
measuring approach. In Models 4 and 5, the proportion of revenues from public 
sources is weakly but significantly and positively associated with advocacy (with a 
coefficient of .004 and .003, respectively). For example, after controlling for field and 
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geographic range, an organization that is fully dependent on government funding is 
expected to rate advocacy activities as slightly more important than organizations that 
receive no government funding (.3 higher on a 4-point scale). Public funding explains 
about 1.45% of the variance in advocacy. However, in Model 6, which includes the 
controls derived from resource dependence theory, the relationship between the 
proportion of public-provided revenues and advocacy is no longer significant. 
Only a few of the control variables affect the degree to which nonprofits engage in 
advocacy. First, the geographic range of operation had a strong and positive impact. 
Thus, advocacy was more important for nonprofits operating on the regional, 
national, or international level than for those only active locally. As shown in all 
models, nonprofits operating on the national level devoted about 7% more of their 
total working hours to advocacy than those active at a local level. The field of activity 
also affected the level of advocacy. Nonprofits pooled in the category “other field” 
are more engaged in advocacy than those active in the field of education. However, 
overall, our findings support neither H1 and H1a nor H2 and H2a. 
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Table 4: Nonprofits’ Receipt of Public Funding and Advocacy 
OLS 
Share of working  
hours devoted to advocacy 
Importance of  
advocacy activities 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables 
Co- 
efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE 
Constant 10.472*** 1.482 11.780*** 2.915 12.161*** 3.070 2.092*** 0.145 1.393*** 0.280 1.311*** 0.298 
Receipt of public revenues (0|1) −.229 1.649 .861 1.576 .689 1.595 .203 0.162 .229 0.157 .215 0.159 
Size (ln of total income) — — −.280 0.213 −.329 0.219 — — .003 0.021 .006 0.021 
Field: Social (ref. cat.) — — — — — — — — — — — — 
 Recreation (0|1) — — −3.094* 1.777 −3.275* 1.782 — — .454** 0.177 .451** 0.177 
 Education (0|1) — — 4.792** 2.146 4.835** 2.159 — — .691*** 0.217 .702*** 0.218 
 Other (0|1) — — −2.622 1.645 −2.939* 1.673 — — .225 0.164 .186 0.166 
Geographical range: Local (ref. cat.) — — — — — — — — — — — — 
 Regional (0|1) — — 2.202 1.473 1.950 1.487 — — .460*** 0.148 .447*** 0.149 
 National (0|1) — — 7.535*** 1.958 6.785*** 2.017 — — .631*** 0.199 .641*** 0.204 
 International (0|1) — — 3.838* 2.051 3.394 2.071 — — .316 0.209 .305 0.210 
Existing competitors (0|1) — — — — 1.032 2.787 — — — — −.438 0.279 
Alternative sources of revenue (0|1) — — — — 1.954 1.228 — — — — .111 0.122 
Diversity of revenue (index) — — — — −0.857 2.174 — — — — .194 0.217 
R2 .000  .154  .164  .006  .131  .144  
Adjusted R2 −.004  .124  .102  .002  .102  .104  
Note. Dependent variable: Advocacy; shares of working hours devoted to advocacy: n = 242; advocacy activities: n = 249. OLS = ordinary least squares; ref. cat. = reference 
category. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Table 5: Nonprofits’ Share of Public Revenues and Advocacy 
OLS 
Share of working hours devoted to advocacy Importance of advocacy activities 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variables Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE Co-efficient SE 
Constant 10.806*** 1.047 12.219*** 2.771 12.470*** 2.961 2.082*** 0.103 1.449*** 0.267 1.369*** 0.288 
Share of public revenues (%) −.011 0.018 .005 0.018 .004 0.018 .004** 0.002 .003* 0.002 .003 0.002 
Size (ln of total income) — — −.268 0.212 −.323 0.220 — — .003 0.021 .006 0.021 
Field: Social (ref. cat.) — — — — — — — — — — — — 
 Recreation (0|1) — — −3.183* 1.792 −3.352* 1.796 — — .403** 0.178 .408** 0.178 
 Education (0|1) — — −2.691 1.639 −2.996* 1.666 — — .660*** 0.214 .674*** 0.216 
 Other (0|1) — — 4.662** 2.131 4.744** 2.147 — — .210 0.163 .175 0.165 
Geographical range: Local (ref. cat.) — — — — — — — — — — — — 
 Regional (0|1) — — 2.184 1.473 1.941 1.487 — — .458*** 0.148 .448*** 0.149 
 National (0|1) — — 7.511*** 1.962 6.765*** 2.021 — — .648*** 0.199 .653*** 0.205 
 International (0|1) — — 3.792* 2.051 3.359 2.070 — — .305 0.208 .296 0.210 
Existing competitors (0|1) — — — — 1.164 2.812 — — — — −.368 0.281 
Alternative sources of revenue (0|1) — — — — 1.977 1.229 — — — — .105 0.122 
Diversity of revenue (index) — — — — −.791 2.170 — — — — .194 0.216 
R2 .002  .153  .164  .018  .136  .146  
Adjusted R2 −.003  .124  .124  .014  .107  .106  
Note. Dependent variable: Advocacy; share of working hours devoted to advocacy: n = 242; advocacy activities: n = 249. OLS = ordinary least squares; ref. cat. = reference 
category. *p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01. 
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Discussion, Limitations, and Recommendations for Further Research 
Our empirical findings on NPOs in Austria are presented against the backdrop of the 
controversial debates about nonprofit dependence on public funding, which have arisen in 
recent decades. The findings suggest that there is no significant relationship between 
advocacy and the receipt of public funding or the proportion of an organization’s total 
revenue coming from public funding. Even when interaction terms for individual fields 
were included, we discerned no impact on advocacy, either negative or positive. 
Furthermore, the use of different methods to measure advocacy did not have any impact 
on our findings, either, as results did not differ between models using resource-related 
measures and activity-based measures. Hence, our findings do not support our initial 
assumption, namely that the method of measurement might cause conflicting results. 
However, our data do suggest that the degree to which nonprofits engage in advocacy 
is influenced by the geographic range of operation and field of activity. NPOs that are 
active at national level devote a higher proportion of their total working hours to 
advocacy activities, and/or rate these as more important than organizations operating 
locally. These results reflect the arrangement of the nonprofit sector in Austria, because 
local units usually concentrate on the provision of services, leaving advocacy activities to 
national umbrella organizations. 
As for the impact of public funding on advocacy, our results contradict the widespread 
assumption that public funding suppresses nonprofits’ engagement in advocacy. This 
finding is in line with other quantitative studies, particularly those that found no effect 
(Leech, 2006; Suárez, 2009). Chaves et al. (2004), for example, also found that public 
funding had no impact on advocacy, or merely a slightly positive one. However, we were 
unable to confirm their other supposition that the dependence of governments on 
nonprofits as service providers outweighs NPOs’ dependence on public funds. Indeed, we 
controlled for such mutual dependence by using three different variables. First, we 
examined whether organizations with access to alternative funding sources were less 
dependent on the government and therefore freer to engage in advocacy. Although the 
respective coefficients in all models were indeed positive, they lacked statistical 
significance. 
Second, resource dependence theory would lead us to expect that existing competition 
with other organizations would reduce government-nonprofit interdependence and 
therefore lead to fewer incentives for nonprofits to engage in advocacy. Interestingly, we 
found negative coefficients regarding advocacy activities, but positive ones regarding the 
resources devoted to advocacy. Although the effect of competition was insignificant 
across all models, the differing impacts on advocacy activities and resources in the 
sample suggest that, under conditions of competition, nonprofits invest resources in 
advocacy without strengthening advocacy-related objectives. Because our measure 
included resources devoted to public relations, this finding indicates that competition 
brings about advocacy focusing on issues in the nonprofits’ own interests rather than 
those that support their clients. We call this tendency “forced advocacy” to reflect 
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situations where NPOs must engage in advocacy activities purely to achieve public 
recognition, even though advocacy is not one of their key aims. We found this to be a 
result of increased competition but not, surprisingly, of public funding. 
Finally, we expected that nonprofits with more diverse revenue streams would engage 
more in advocacy. Here again, our findings were mixed and insignificant. The fact that 
none of our controls were significant shows that, in contrast to the theory’s suggestions, 
resource dependence does not affect the advocacy activities of nonprofits in Austria. 
Furthermore, the increase in the R2 when these controls are added is extremely low, 
indicating that resource dependence was not very relevant for our sample. 
However, some limitations have to be considered. First, we did not investigate how 
nonprofit advocacy is directed, in particular, whether it is in accordance or at odds with 
government policies. Qualitative studies argue that nonprofits do not necessarily reduce 
the amount of their advocacy, but rather change the content—probably away from 
advocacy not welcomed by government to less critical varieties, or to those it actively 
welcomes (Mosley, 2012; Onyx et al., 2008). Although NPOs in Austria do not seem to 
reduce the amount of work devoted to advocacy when they receive government funding, 
we cannot discern whether they changed the content of their advocacy. Resource 
dependence, however, could cause such behavior. In fact, the measurement of nonprofit 
engagement in advocacy in terms of the extent of such activities, rather than their type 
and quality, points toward a limitation of our study. Future empirical research would need 
to combine qualitative and quantitative approaches to tackle this issue, allowing 
quantitative studies to benefit from new measures of advocacy that capture its quality in 
terms of content and style. 
Second, our study (as others before) is based only on cross-sectional data. Therefore, 
we cannot investigate causalities in general and the lagged effects of public funding, in 
particular. Drawing on resource dependence theory, we have assumed that nonprofits’ 
engagement in advocacy is a function of their revenue structure. However, causality 
could also work the other way round. For instance, organizations that concentrate on 
advocacy could search for alternative sources of revenue to remain independent from the 
government. Hence, longitudinal analyses are required to thoroughly assess whether 
public funding affects nonprofit advocacy or whether the functions preferred by 
nonprofits affect the funding portfolio (Suárez, 2009). 
Finally, we are aware of limitations resulting from the specific characteristics of 
Austrian nonprofits. We argued that Austria is a good example of a so-called corporatist 
nonprofit regime, under which NPOs are closely entwined with the public sector. This 
interdependency is not only to be seen in financial matters but also in terms of practical 
cooperation, as nonprofits take on public responsibilities in many areas. A typical feature 
of this regime is that certain large Austrian NPOs have traditionally had close links to the 
major political parties (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats) and are still frequently 
coupled with those parties (e.g., politicians are board members, former politicians are 
executives, etc.). These NPOs thus have a strong tradition of advocacy, despite depending 
on public funding for their service-providing units. This arrangement might explain why 
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our findings indicated that public funding does not alter nonprofit engagement in 
advocacy. Historical trajectories offer another explanation for the differences between our 
results and those based on samples from the United States. In Austria, and Central Europe 
in general, there has always been a relatively strict differentiation between the advocacy 
and the service function of an organization and a high level of tolerance toward NPOs 
that exert a sociocritical function. Consequently, Austrian NPOs do not seem to be 
reluctant to engage in advocacy even when large proportions of their revenue come from 
public agencies. 
Notes 
1. Such terms, for example, stipulate that nonprofits are obligated to inform their 
financier before issuing media releases or to keep the information they acquire in the 
course of government-subsidized work confidential (Casey & Dalton, 2006). 
2. Along with “advocacy and representation of interests” and “public relations,” these 
were human resource management, sponsoring and donations management, project 
acquisition, administration, management of volunteers, caring for members, delivery of 
goods and services, and “other activities.” 
3. To calculate the percentage of work dedicated to advocacy, we summed up the 
percentages of these two categories. 
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